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The Real Party In Interest - Appellant, Karl H. Lewies ("Lewies"), submits this reply 
brief in support of his appeal from the final decision of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 
District in and for Fremont County (the "Court"). 
1. ARGUMENT 
A. Scope of Review on Appeal. 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority on this issue. (Cf Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 12-14) 
B. The Court abused its discretion in imposing LR.C.P. 11(a)(l) sanctions against Lewies 
based on extraneous conduct, rather than a violation of Rule 11 signature certification requirements. 
Respondents' main argument on this issue is that Rule 11 allows courts to impose sanctions 
for "misguided filings" and "litigative misconduct." (Respondents' Brief, p. 6) However, 
Respondents fail to identify what those terms actually mean. Further, they fail to identify what 
conduct, if any, Lewies engaged in that fell within the meaning of those terms. 
For guidance on what the terms mean, the case of Conley v. Looney, 117 Idaho 627, 630-
31, 790 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Ct. App. 1989) proves helpful. In Conley, the court wrote as follows: 
"This Court recently decided that LR.C.P. 11 sanctions should not be applied to 
make a 'lump-sum compensatory attorney fee award.' Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 
22,773 P.2d 290 (Ct.App.1989). The Kent court further stated that '[i]n our view, 
Rule II(a)(I) is not a broad compensatory law. It is a court management tool. The 
power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on 
discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the 
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overall course of a lawsuit.' Id. at 23, 773 P.2d at 291. Here, it is impossible to 
determine from the record whether or not the LR.C.P. 11 sanction was imposed 
for particular litigative misconduct (the filing of frivolous motions) (or as a broad 
form of compensation in the form of an award of attorney fees incurred to defend 
the entire action." (Emphasis added.) 
Additionally, in Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 23, 773 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct. App. 1989), the 
court wrote concerning Rule 11 as follows: 
"This rule authorizes sanctions (including attorney fees) for pleadings which are 
not 'well grounded in fact,' which are not 'warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law,' or 
which are 'interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.' In our view, Rule 
II(a)(l) is not a broad compensatory law. It is a court management tool. The 
power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on 
discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the 
overall course of a lawsuit." 
According to the above authorities, litigative misconduct means "filing frivolous motions." 
In the instant case the Court determined that Lewies' petitions were far from frivolous. As Judge 
Moeller said, they contained "important issues" and he wanted to "get straight to the merits." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 33) 
Respondents' also argue that in imposing Rule 11 sanctions the Court applied a totality of 
the circumstances test to Lewies' conduct and "viewed Lewies' conduct in the broad picture of the 
'integrity of the judicial process;'" and that "the integrity of the judicial process (litigative 
misconduct) was harmed by Lewies' failure to identifY the significant conflict issues that would 
inevitable [sic] be created by Lewies' filings." (Respondents' Brief, p. 9) They then cite the 
Court's decision language as follows, "Lewies' filings of the petitions against a known, future client 
was a significant offense against the integrity ofthe judicial system." (Id., p. 10) 
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Respondents' are contending that Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate because given the 
totality of the circumstances Lewies failed to identify significant conflict issues (pertaining to a 
"known,Juture client") and that such failure harmed the integrity of the judicial process. However, 
as previously explained in Appellant's Brief at page 16, nothing in Rule 11 prohibits an attorney 
from filing a well-grounded legal action against a known, future client. Further, the Court cited no 
authority that prohibits such a filing. Rather, conflicts of interest are matters governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct - they are ethical concerns. Running afoul of an ethics rule is not 
tantamount to filing papers for an improper purpose subjecting one to sanctions under Rule 11.' 
Next, the notion that filing well-grounded petitions against a known, future client constituted 
an improper purpose under Rule 11 because doing so "harmed the integrity of the judicial process" 
is without merit. The Court clearly believed the petitions contained "important issues,,2 so the bare 
fact that they were filed against a known future client cannot support imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions. Under Rule 11 's analytical framework, since the Court openly acknowledged the 
importance of the merits of the petitions/ it could not subsequently find that they had been filed for 
any improper purpose. As explained by Judge William Schwarzer, " .. .If a reasonably clear legal 
justification can be shown for the filing of the paper in question, no improper purpose can be found 
and sanctions are inappropriate." Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 
Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985). 
1 In the instant case, no ethical violations were found. CR. 188) 
2 Appellant's Brief, p. 33. 
3 See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 32-33. 
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Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Lewies for filing petitions that admittedly contained 
"important issues" was an abuse of discretion. 
Also of substantial significance in determining whether the Court improperly considered 
extrinsic factors in imposing Rule 11 sanctions was the Court's opening question put to Lewies, 
"What were you thinking filing these petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were 
elected to be Fremont County Prosecuting Attorney?" 4 The judge improperly delved into Lewies' 
subjective intent. As a direct result of the Court's foray into state of mind, the following harmful 
consequences warned of by Judge Shwarzer5 actually ensued: (l) satellite litigation was spawned 
(i.e. this appeal); (2) advocacy was chilled (i.e. a private practice attorney, once elected to public 
office albeit not yet sworn-in, can no longer zealously represent6 his private clients); and (3) Lewies 
was stigmatized by the bad faith finding (i.e. publication of the finding in regional newspapers 
resulting in damage to Lewies' professional reputation and community standing). 
Rather than venturing into the subjective realm of states of mind to discern why Lewies filed 
the petitions, the Court should have objectively examined Rule 11 sanctions in light of existing 
4 See, Appellant's Brief, p. 7. 
5 "In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the court need not delve into the attorney's 
subjective intent. ,If a court were to entertain inquiries into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially 
harmful consequences, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chilling advocacy ... Finally, a bad 
faith test would make courts more reluctant to impose sanctions for fear of stigmatizing a lawyer by a bad faith fmding." 
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) 
6 I.R.P.C. 1.3, comment 1, provides in relevant part, as follows: "A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a 
client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical 
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and 
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." Comment 2 to I.R.P.C. 
1.3, provides in relevant part, "A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time ... ; in 
extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute oflimitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed." 
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federal and state authorities and detennined whether Lewies had made a proper investigation upon 
reasonable inquiry into the factual basis and legal basis for the petitions. Durrant v. Christensen, 
117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1990). By inquiring into Lewies' state of mind and 
apparently concluding that he harbored some sort of political grudge against the County 
Commissioners that served as a bad faith motive for filing petitions against them, the Court 
ventured far beyond any actual evidence before it, and far beyond Rule 11 's objective standard. 
Imposition of sanctions without finding a lack of reasonable inquiry was not an adequate 
analysis under Rule 11. Hanfv. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364,816 P.2d 320 (1991). Without 
such a detennination, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. Ibid. 
C. The petitions filed by Lewies in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 did not violate 
the signature certification requirements ofLR.C.P. II(a)(1). 
Respondents argue that "Lewies erroneously suggests that Rule 11 can only be used where a 
filing violates the signature certification requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l1(a)(1)." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 6) They also argue that "Lewies' reading of Rule 11 is overly simplistic and 
ignores the explicit requirement that an attorney who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper for an 
improper purpose." (Ibid., p. 12) 
Contrary to Respondents' understanding, the fact is that a Rule 11 violation occurs at the 
time the offending paper is signed and submitted to the court. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 
496 U.S. 384,405, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed. 2d 359 (1990). "The certification which results 
from the attorney's signature of the paper is directed at the three substantive prongs of the rule: its 
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factual basis, its legal basis, and its legitimate purpose .... " (Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21, citing 
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, Shwarzer, William W., 104 F.R.D. 181 
(1985» However, in the instant case, the Court failed to inquire into any of the three prongs. It 
made no inquiry into the factual basis of the petitions, it made no inquiry into the legal basis of the 
petitions, and it made no objective inquiry into the legitimate purposes of the petitions. 
Accordingly, the Court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions cannot be sustained. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-22) 
D. Attorney's fees as Rule 11 sanctions. 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority to refute Lewies' contention that Rule 
11 is a sanctions statute and not a fee shifting provision. By ordering Lewies to pay attorney's fees 
for time Hall spent on motions to disqualify him, but then converting such fee award into Rule 11 
sanctions, sua sponte (without any motion or argument from Hall), was an abuse of discretion. (See, 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-23) 
E. The Court erred in finding that Lewies "had not withdrawn as counsel fOr the County" 
because Lewies never represented the County in either case number CV-12-580 or CV-12-581. 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority to refute Lewies' contention that he 
never represented the County in these proceedings, but that from the very outset, Hall did. (See, 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25) In fact, Hall still does. 
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F. The court erred in finding that Lewies' actions "delaved adjudication ofthe petitions [or 
judicial review. " 
Respondents argue that "Lewies did not believe the county commissioners had made the 
necessary findings to hire Nelson Hall Parry & Tucker to represent the County on the petitions." 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 13) Respondents' further argue that "Lewies' continued instance [sic] on 
who could properly represent the County caused a delay in this matter .... additional briefing was 
necessary and further hearings were required." (Ibid., p. 13) 
Lewies agrees that he did not believe the county commissioners had made the requisite 
constitutional finding of necessity to hire Hall and that the "necessity issue" required briefing and 
hearings. However, such in-court activity can provide no basis for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 15) Indeed, Judge Moeller, himself, found the necessity issue to be a "very 
tough question" and he was relieved the question had been voluntarily withdrawn by the Office of 
the Prosecuting Attorney so he did not have to decide the question. (Ibid., pp. 28-29) 
Because there was a reasonably clear legal justification for raising the constitutional 
necessity issue, and because it was raised in-court, the Court could not find that any paper had been 
filed for any improper purposes that could justify imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 
G. The Court erred by "deeming it appropriate" for the County to have retained private 
legal counsel, Blake G. Hall, Esq., to represent it in case numbers CV-12-580 and CV-12-581 
because the legal question whether the County's hiring of private counsel in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution's necessity requirement had been voluntarily withdrawn by motion of the Office of the 
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Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore, was not a question presented to the Court for its decision. 
Respondents have misunderstood the argument advanced by Lewies on this issue. In their 
brief Respondents write that "Lewies continues to argue that the County could not retain private 
legal counsel." (Respondents' Brief, p. 15) That misses the point. Lewies is not arguing whether or 
not the County could retain private legal counsel. Indeed, Lewies' deputy prosecuting attorney 
withdrew that legal question. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-29) Rather, Lewies is arguing that "the 
Court improperly decided a question that was not before it." (Ibid., p. 28) 
Respondents have submitted no argument or authority on the actual issue presented on 
appeal. 
H. The Court erred in finding that Lewies was unable to "complete" his representation of 
petitioners. 
Respondents argue that any suggestion by Lewies that he completed his representation of 
petitioners is "devoid of verifiable facts in the record." (Respondents' Brief, p. 11) However, 
Respondents' have seemingly overlooked Lewies' undisputed oral representations made to the 
Court, and his undisputed affidavit contained in the record, showing that his representation of 
petitioners was limited 7 to drafting and timely filing petitions for judicial review in order to 
preserve and protect his clients' legal rights relative to their private roads. (Appellant's Brief, p. 30) 
More to the point, though, Respondents' have submitted no argument or authority to refute 
7I.R.C.P. 1.2(c), provides, "A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under 
the circumstances and the client gives informed consent." Comment 6 to the rule, provides in relevant part that, "A 
limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation." 
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the issue actually presented on appeal: that "unless and until an actual case or controversy was 
presented to the Court on the question whether Lewies had completed his limited representation of 
petitioners, the Court should have refrained from issuing an opinion on the matter." (Ibid., pp. 30-
31) 
L Judge Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies by engaging in the 
following actions: 
Respondents argue that "Had Lewies legitimately believed Judge Moeller was biased or 
prejudiced against him, his appropriate remedy was to file a motion for disqualification for cause. 
Lewies did not pursue this remedy and any claims are now waived." (Respondents' Brief, p. 17) 
While LR.C.P. 40(d)(2) allows any party to an action to file a motion to disqualify a judge 
for cause, failure to file such a motion does not waive a party's right to claim bias or prejudice on 
appeal. Indeed, up until the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Lewies first read the 
language contained in it and denouncing him personally - e.g. "committing a significant offinse 
against the integrity of the judicial system ,,8 - Lewies could not possibly have known the full extent 
of any latent bias or prejudice against him. But, once the Memorandum Decision was issued, 
published in the regional newspapers, and the general public and members of the Idaho State Bar 
began commenting on the judge's disdain for Lewies, actual bias became patently evident. 
8 Appellant's Brief, p. 38, R. 182. 
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a.) Ex parte communication. 
Respondents argue that the "district court did not violate Canon 3(B)(7) because there was 
no discussion of substantive issues." However, when Judge Moeller warned Lewies, and only 
Lewies, not to let a "political grudge interfere with his professional judgment," to "decide what 
hill he wanted to die on," and that the conversation "never happened," he was warning about the 
petitions Lewies had filed against the County Commissioners (i.e. substantive law).9 He was not 
warning Lewies about any aspect of procedural law. IO 
By delving into Lewies' state of mind and concluding that he harbored some sort of 
political grudge against the County Commissioners that served as his motivation for filing 
petitions for judicial review against them, Judge Moeller ventured far beyond any actual 
evidence before him. Then, by acting on his own unsupported conclusions about Lewies' state 
of mind and initiating an ex parte communication to warn Lewies about not letting his political 
grudge interfere with his professional judgment, Judge Moeller demonstrated actual bias or 
prejudice. 
b.) Converting an award of attorney's fees into Rule 11 sanctions, sua sponte. 
Respondents' argue that "The district court further explained its rationale in awarding fees 
as a sanction pursuant to Rule 11 ... as follows: 
9 "Substantive law" means "The part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of 
parties. Cf. Procedural law." Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. (2009). 
10 "Procedural law" means "The rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as 
opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves." Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. (2009). 
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'At the conclusion of the January 22,2013 hearing, the Court invited the County to 
submit an affidavit setting forth the attorney fees reasonably incurred in seeking 
Lewies' disqualification (emphasis added). Although much of the oral argument 
and briefing has since focused on a prevailing party analysis under I.R.c.P. 54(e) 
and I.C. § 12-121, the Court has concluded that such an effort is misplaced. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that 'the reasons for which attorney fees may 
be awarded pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) are not reasons that will 
support an award of sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l) .. .Instead, the heart of 
the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the provisions of 
Rule 11 ... ,,, 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-22) 
Yes, it is true that the Court invited the County to submit an affidavit setting forth attorney 
fees "reasonably incurred in seeking Lewies' disqualification." (Ibid.) But, why did it then convert 
that fee award into Rule 11 sanctions? What went into the Court's conversion decision? 
All that is actually known, is that in its Memorandum Decision the Court arbitrarily 
announced, "Instead, the heart of the issue before the Court appears to more closely fall under the 
provisions of Rule 11." Did the Court undertake a Rule 11 analysis? Did it objectively inquire into 
the three prongs of Rule 11 - the petitions' factual basis, legal basis, and legitimate purposes? Not 
at all. So, what caused the Court to convert its award of routine attorney's fees into Rule 11 
sanctions? 
Applying a totality of circumstances test to the following facts suggests that the Court's sua 
sponte conversion may have been the product of bias or prejudice against Lewies. The facts are as 
follows: (1) the Court's opening question put to Lewies was, "What were you thinking filing these 
petitions against Fremont County just weeks after you were elected to be Fremont County 
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Prosecuting Attorney" (Appellant's Brief, p. 7); (2) the Court delved into Lewies' subjective state 
of mind - and found a political grudge; (3) the Court subjectively believed (without any supporting 
evidence) that Lewies had filed the petitions to "provoke" the County Commissioners (Ibid., p. 32, 
fn. 26); (4) Judge Moeller initiated an ex parte communication and warned Lewies "not to let a 
political grudge interfere with his professional judgment" (Id., p. 32); (5) the Court warned the 
parties in open court "that it was going to do what it could to put an end to [the pettiness]" (Id., p. 
31, fn. 23); and (6) the Court publically denounced Lewies for, among other things, committing a 
"significant offense against the integrity of the judicial system" by filing petitions against a known, 
future client. (Id., p. 38) 
Based on these facts, it reasonably appears that as a result of the "political grudge" 
conclusion reached by the Court after its inquiry into Lewies' subjective intentions for filing the 
petitions, the Court was biased or prejudiced against Lewies, and as such, was not and acting fairly 
and impartially towards him when it converted its earlier award of routine attorney's fees into Rule 
11 sanctions. 
c.) Disregarding allegations of Hall's unethical and improper conduct. 
Contrary to Respondents' arguments that there was no unethical or improper conduct by 
Hall (Respondents' Brief, pp. 22-29), the actual issue on appeal is not whether Hall committed the 
alleged acts of unethical or improper conduct, but whether the Court demonstrated bias or prejudice 
against Lewies by choosing not to mention in its Memorandum Decision - not one word - any of 
the allegations he made against Hall, but going to great lengths to denounce Lewies. 
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During the course of the proceedings, Lewies alleged three instances of unethical or 
improper conduct engaged in by Hall. First, that Hall should have conducted a reasonable inquiry 
under Rule 11 into the facts prior to filing motions to disqualify Lewies. (Transcript p. 61, lines 15-
25) (Transcript p. 64, lines 13-25; and p. 65, lines 1-18) Second, that Hall violated LR.P.C. 1.11 
prohibiting attorneys who are currently serving as public employees from ... negotiating for private 
employment with any person who is involved as a party in a matter in which the lawyer is 
participating ... (Transcript p. 69, lines 24-25; and p. 70, lines 1-18) Third, that Hall violated 
LR.P.C. 3.3 prohibiting lawyers from making false statements of fact to a tribunal, as follows: "He 
says he's billing $225, that's not the case, he got a contract for $150." (Transcript p. 70, lines 19-25; 
andp. 71, lines 1-10) 
Yet, the Court mentioned nothing at all about any of Lewies' allegations against Hall in its 
Memorandum Decision. Why not? Why not at least mention the allegations, and if deemed 
unfounded, then say so. By completely ignoring the allegations against Hall, in their entirety, it 
reasonably appears that the Court was biased or prejudiced against Lewies, and as such, was not and 
acting fairly and impartially towards him. 
d.) Issuing a publically available Memorandum Decision denouncing Lewies. 
Respondents' have submitted no argument or authority on this issue. (Cj, Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 38-39) 
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J. Attorney's fees should not be awarded to the County. 
Respondents' argue that they are entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, 
because Lewies' appeal was brought "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." However, as has 
been shown in the preceding pages, there is clearly a reasonable basis in both fact and law for 
appealing imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against petitions that contained important issues; and 
there is clearly a reasonable basis in both fact and law for appealing whether the Court demonstrated 
bias or prejudice against Lewies. 
Under LA.R. 41 (a), Lewies respectfully requests the Supreme Court to permit his later claim 
for attorney's fees on the grounds that Respondents' have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law in this matter. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that the lower Court 
failed to conduct an adequate analysis under Rule 11 before imposing sanctions on Lewies, and 
therefore, such sanctions cannot be sustained. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court should find that 
the petitions filed by Lewies did not violate Rule 11 signature certification requirements; that the 
lower Court's imposition of attorney's fees as a Rule 11 sanction was improper and cannot be 
sustained; that the lower Court erred in finding that Lewies (a) had not withdrawn as counsel for 
the county; (b) delayed adjudication of the petitions for judicial review; (c) deeming it 
appropriate for the Commissioners to have retained Hall as private counsel; (d) finding that 
Lewies was unable to complete his representation of petitioners; and that presiding Judge 
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Moeller demonstrated bias and/or prejudice against Lewies. 
Submitted this 9th day of October, 2013 
Karl H. Lewies, Esq. 
Real Party in Interest - Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a two true and correct copies of the foregoing REAL PARTY 
IN INTEREST - APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF has this 9th day of October, 2013, been served 
upon the individuals listed below by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, with proper postage 
thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Hon. Gregory W. Moeller 
FREMONT COUNTY COURT HOUSE 
151 W. IstN. 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL, ANGELL, STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
W. Lynn Hossner, Esq. 
A TTORNEY AT LAW 
109 N. 2nd West 
St. Anthony, Idaho 83445 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Karl H. Lewies 
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